

What happened in Copenhagen and where to next?

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What
happened in
Copenhagen?

Copenhagen Accord – what was agreed


WHAT WAS AGREED

- 2°C goal (but pledges add up to more than 3 °C; does not state pre-industrial levels)
- Bringing the US in: economy-wide binding emission reduction targets, notify by 31 January 2010 – how to bring in: schedule of ‘targets’
- Mitigation actions by the more advanced developing countries, also by 31st January 2010 – bring in schedule of actions and mechanism to register
- Measure report and verify - resolving a key dispute over review vs transparency
- Finance: transparently accounted finance \$10 bn per year up to 2012, i.e. approaching \$30bn immediately up to 2012 and \$100 billion per year by 2020
 - Conditionalities
 - But all of GEF from 1994 to 2009 was \$18 bn
- Technology development and transfer mechanism, but cannot operationalise without COP decision
- Review by 2015 against 1.5 °C – if what is politically agreed is not enough, need to strengthen later
- Deal among key protagonists on mitigation, with representation from regions and interests, minus one

Copenhagen Accord – what was **not** agreed

WHAT WAS NOT AGREED

- No new treaty, or mandate to agree one, or continuation of one we have (had?) – Kyoto
- Disagreement on a comprehensive international adaptation programme as a priority or whether it should be an adaptation framework – and still tied to response measures
- Low level of ambition of developed countries targets - 14-19% below 1990 level by 2020
 - And loopholes remain wide open
- Pledges by developing countries, are relative to business-as-usual (BAU) – better, but also not enough yet – and baselines uncertain
- For DCs to do more, or the finance will have to become real, unconditional and internationally verified
- Developing countries more ambitious than developed countries – less unambitious
- Added up, really more than 3°C
- Dropped long term target to cut emissions (the language on 50% reductions by 2050 from 1990 levels)
 - Because no agreement on equitably sharing carbon space
- No agreement where money will come from
- No consensus among 193 countries



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Formal negotiating text

- CA 'noted' in very short decision
 - Cannot operationalise Fund or Technology Mechanism
- Official negotiating text forwarded
 - L.7/Rev.1 and 9 addenda
 - Better structure for developing countries
 - E.g. mitigation: kept a clear fire-wall between commitments by developed countries, actions by developing countries
 - But had no agreement on finance numbers
 - Process: agreed by all, more protection for smaller countries
- Also forwarded negotiating text for KP
 - Still alive, but in 'intensive care'
- To June negotiators meetings and COP / CMP in Mexico, December 2010



Assessment:
was
Copenhagen a
failure, a
foundational
event or a
greenwash?

Copenhagen read in very different ways by different people

Global Leaders Leave Job Unfinished

Copenhagen: our lost chance

"Copenhagen was never going to be the end"

"A Meaningful and Unprecedented Breakthrough Here in Copenhagen"

Did Copenhagen talks open door to a new global order?

The Copenhagen Accord: A Big Step Forward

Copenhagen- the Munich of our times

Requiem For A Crowded Planet

'Only extinction of capitalism will ensure the survival of our species';
Reunión sobre cambio climático Copenhague

Pressure on poor at Copenhagen led to failure, not diplomatic wrangling

The summit was a culmination of attempts by rich countries to steamroller the G77 into accepting a deal not in their interests

They didn't get it done.

Climate Shame: get back to the table

After Copenhagen: Now a New Start?

Not the US response



Brokenhagen,Tokenhagen or Hopenhagen?

- Copenhagen was many things
 - but it was NOT the breakthrough the we needed
 - Dr Seuss: delegates and leaders “blew it”
 - Brokenhagen – failure
 - Gap between art of possible and requirements of science; not FAB; dysfunctional process
- Some observers positive on Cph Accord
 - US: New process, first step
 - Political deal unlocked some difficult issues
 - ALBA: victory that CA was not imposed
 - Hopenhagen: laid foundation for future work
- Greenwash – Tokenhagen
 - no legaly treaty, therefore play up political deal
 - Yes, but: ignores the question of which is more effective



Deeper
questions:
what
happened and
why?

Shifts in overall dynamics: objective and subjective factors

- Context of objective external factors
 - Recession – implications for finance
 - increasing scarcity – food, water
 - looming peak oil
 - overconsumption
- Subjective factors
 - Great expectations – but then lowered
 - US not ready to negotiate
 - EU decision to abandon Kyoto
 - Inept chairing by Danish PM
 - exclusion of the ALBA
 - Not pure obstructionism - needed to demonstrate that exclusion won't work
 - Lack of responsibility in engagement by some individuals in the G77
- Clearly distinguish this from the legitimate concerns over process, especially by smaller developing countries

Process dominates substance

- Lack of political will to do the deal trumped urgency of action required by science
Procedural equity is critical
- But process can be used to block
- Problems:
 - Process at three levels: official – Ministerial – summit
- Parties were too far apart and could not produce a text capable of political sign-off
- Political deal was disconnected from official process
- Climate negotiations highly complex: too political for the technicians, too technical for the politicians

The world is changing

- Geopolitical shifts: Relations between powers not what they were in 1992
- China as the world power in waiting; has financial resources, and able to negotiate from strength; deep feeling of responsibility; not yet use to new role (in the past, much more reserved)
- US seeking to assert its role as hegemon (while it lasts) and seeks to re-write the rules; US not fully engaged in negotiations, in absence of legislation
- EU not able to lead as in the past
- Strong insistence on CBDR by developing countries, despite changing realities and because concerns of poor and weak not properly represented
- Process has not yet caught up with new dynamics
- US openly criticising the UNFCCC, EU abandoning Kyoto



So how do we
move forward
– big picture



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Future of UNFCCC?

- UNFCCC did not deliver
 - lack of willingness to use every opportunity
 - Ban Ki-moon’s face-saving statement: “This accord cannot be everything that everyone hoped for, but it is an essential beginning,” (UNFCCC 2009)
- Will the UNFCCC become a permanent negotiating forum,
 - a la WTO? (and as ‘successful’);
 - Or a talk-shop, a la CSD ?
 - Or all done in G20
- Trend to work in smaller for a (N-20 disarmament; C-29 climate; G20 finance and all, as long as you don’t touch the P-5 global security)
- Will climate action be driven by national politics, “in conformity with domestic law” (US line)
- Challenge is to bring political deal reflected in Cph Accord back into the official UNFCCC text

Future of groupings

- Played old games – fights between extremes
 - OPEC failure is success
 - AOSIS hard line: 1.5°C and 350 ppmv; legal treaty
- More assertive and new groupings
 - Africa pushed hard for Kyoto
 - LDCs were more vocal
 - BASIC since 2008, but more prominent, esp on deal on MRV with US
 - Members of ALBA:
 - Left-leaning Latin Americans (with some OPEC)
 - ‘rights of Mother Earth’, climate justice
 - procedurally correct
- Some commentators predict end of G77, shift to new alliances
 - “the G-77 may be spent as a unified force” (Doniger 2009)
 - “groupings such as the G77/China which are now dysfunctional and anachronistic” (Mehra 2009)
 - New alliances between some DCs and EU?
 - BUT small countries will continue to seek protection in unity (esp on adaptation)
 - G77 will need to find ways of becoming more effective
- Ultimately, poor countries and communities most at risk from the impacts of climate change

Where will climate action be done?

Scenarios of different fora:

- End of UNFCCC
- Cling to UNFCCC at all costs
- Smaller groups: Shift to G20 / MEF
- Fragmented multi-lateralism: A and M in fora
- Fragmentation: No global process, domestic
- Stick with UNFCCC
- Permanent negotiation / talk shop (WTO)
- Not by governments at all: People's Summit



What if there were NO global agreement?

- Does the movement for global justice have within it the basis for global democracy?
- Can we count on business?
- If nation-states fail to agree, are other forms of action effective?
- How could we design a multi-lateralism that is more effective and mature (in the way in which we negotiate, e.g. showing restraint and seriousness about substance)? How can we do that while remaining inclusive?



Since
Copenhagen

AI submissions by 31 January 2010

- US: “emissions reduction target” of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020
 - As little as 2% below 1990 levels
 - conditional on others notifying
 - “in conformity with anticipated US energy and climate legislation” – will Obama spend political capital on climate
- Canada
 - "17%, to be aligned with the final economy-wide emissions target of the United States in enacted legislation."
- Annex I in aggregate 14-19% below 1990 levels by 2020, well below range of 25-40%

Developing countries: less unambitious

- China: reduce carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020
 - In climate plan, aligned with 5-yr plan
- India: reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 20 to 25% by 2020
- Brazil 36% plus NAMAs, mainly avoided deforestation in Amazon
- SA numbers as announced by the Presidency before Copenhagen, now internationalised
- Several others

Which is more likely to happen

- – the US target or China's actions on intensity?
My bets are on China – what is planned will get done. If the US passes its law, that will also be given effect – but that's still a big if.

SA's NAMA – 31 Jan 2010

- “The commitment of South Africa to play its part to address climate change has already been reflected in President Zuma’s announcement made on the 6th of December 2009. South Africa has conducted an internationally reviewed study of its mitigation potential in the context of long-term mitigation scenarios, which has informed the nationally appropriate mitigation action that may be taken. In accordance with the provisions of Article 12 paragraph 1(b) as well as Article 12 paragraph 4 and pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Convention, South Africa reiterates that it will take nationally appropriate mitigation action to enable **a 34% deviation below the ‘Business As Usual’ emissions growth trajectory by 2020 and a 42% deviation below the ‘Business As Usual’ emissions growth trajectory by 2025**. In accordance with Article 4.7 of the Convention, the extent to which this action will be implemented **depends on the provision of financial resources**, the transfer of technology and capacity building support by developed countries. Therefore, the above action requires the finalisation of an ambitious, fair, effective and binding multilateral **agreement** under the UNFCCC and its’ Kyoto Protocol at COP 16 and CMP 6 in Mexico to enable the delivery of this support. With financial, technology and capacity building support from the international community, this level of effort will enable South Africa’s green house gas **emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025**, plateau for approximately a decade and decline in absolute terms thereafter.”

http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/southafricacphaccord_app2.pdf

SA numbers based on LTMS, adjusted for electricity

- Long-term mitigation scenarios (LTMS): peak, plateau and decline agreed by Cabinet mid-2008
- Now ‘internationalised’ by Zuma Presidency
- LTMS numbers formed basis of calculating ‘deviation below BAU’
 - Based on rigorous modeling combined with strategic stakeholder inputs
 - Adjusted for near-term electricity plans
- Even with adjustments, possible to slow the growth of emissions significantly – if take aggressive action elsewhere

Association

- Not all countries mention Accord
- Developing countries not used format of table
- Storm in a tea-cup
 - Substantively associating through numbers
 - Others: no numbers, but statement of association
 - Albania, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Fiji, Ghana, Iceland, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, Serbia, Trinidad and Tobago

Focus on national action – and local

UCT Press cordially invites you to join us for the launch of

TAKING ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Long term mitigation scenarios
for South Africa

by Harald Winkler

- DATE:** Wednesday, 17 February 2010
TIME: 17h30 for 18h00
VENUE: Juta Auditorium, Juta Head Office,
1st Floor, Sunclare Building, Claremont
RSVP: Natasha Talliard at events@juta.co.za or 021 659 2336
by 10 February 2010

www.uctpress.co.za



The End



Further information

- *Copenhagen decisions, Accord and submissions*
<http://unfccc.int>
- *National policy process*
<http://www.ccs summit2009.co.za/>
- *Taking action on climate change (book)*
<http://tiny.cc/m5Awt>